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This paper addresses how creditor protection affects the volatility of stock market prices. Credit protection
reduces the probability of oscillations between binding and non-binding states of the credit constraint;
thereby lowering the rate of return variance. We test this prediction of a Tobin's q model, by using
cross-country panel regression on stock price volatility in 40 countries over the period from 1984 to
2004. Estimated probabilities of a liquidity crisis are used as a proxy for the probability that credit
constraints are binding. We find support for the hypothesis that institutions that help reduce the probability
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Recent literature on law and ﬁnance has emphasized the role of strong institutions, such as credi-
tor protection, in fostering the development of ﬁnancial markets. Creditor rights regulation helps
mitigating the problems of asymmetry information and moral hazard between creditors and bor-
rowers. Hence, it is shown to aﬀect credit cycle and credit market breadth. For example, La
Porta et al. (1997) ﬁnd that countries with poor creditor protection have smaller debt markets.
Their ﬁndings are conﬁrmed in Levine (2004) and Djankov et al. (2006), with more sophisticated
econometric methods and boarder country coverage. Burger and Warnock (2006) further ﬁnd that
countries with strong creditor rights have more developed local bond markets, and rely less on
foreign-currency bonds. Moreover, Galindo and Micco (2005) report that strong creditor rights can
reduce the volatility of credit market.
Beside the impact on macro economy, creditor protection also aﬀect ﬁrm’s investment and
operation. It lowers ﬁrm’s borrowing cost and increases ﬁrm’s value (e.g. La Porta et al. (2000),
and Bae and Goyal (2003)). Furthermore, it reduce cash-ﬂow risk, operating income variability,
and operating leverage (e.g. Claessens et al. (2001)).
So far, these studies focus on the credit market and very little on the stock market. In this
paper, we try to ﬁll a gap by looking at how creditor rights aﬀect the stock return volatility
for market aggregates.1 We argue that creditor protection that may relax credit constraints is
also associated with equity price volatility, and the institutional weakness in the credit market
exacerbates the volatility. We expect that better creditor protection could reduce market volatility.
The main intuition is as follows. Firms need to provide collaterals to creditors and thus face
credit constraints. When the credit constraint oscillates between binding and non-binding, ﬁrms’
1Some studies have examined how corporate control aﬀects the dispersion of stock prices with a market. For
example, Morck et al. (2000) look at the stock price co-movement within a country. They ﬁnd that co-movement
is more pronounced in poor economies than in rich economies, which they contribute to cross-country diﬀerences in
property rights. Our work is not concerned with the idiosyncratic dispersion of stock prices, but rather with the
instability in the aggregate.
2investment, operation and capital return will ﬂuctuate as well. But the probability of this oscillation
can be reduced with better creditor protection. Consequently, ﬁrm value (ﬁrst moment) will rise,
and the volatility (second moment) of ﬁrm value will decline.
We illustrate this intuition with a Tobin’s q investment model. We start with the free market
case, and derive the closed-form solution of Tobin’s q (our theoretical counterpart of stock price)
and its volatility. We then introduce the credit constraint, which depends on the degree of creditor
protection and ﬁrm’s productivity. We show that given a distribution of productivity shocks, weak
creditor protection causes more variation of Tobin’s q, due to the oscillation between credit binding
and nonbinding.
We then put the prediction into empirical testing. We look at aggregated stock return volatility
in 41 countries over the years 1984-2004. We ﬁnd a empirical regularity that better creditor
protection is associated with lower stock price volatility. We then use a two-stage cross-country
analysis to further examine this regularity. In the ﬁrst stage, we look at how creditor protection
aﬀects the probability of liquidity crises, deﬁned as a large rise of real interest rate, which serves as
our proxy for the probability of credit binding. We ﬁnd that better creditor protection reduces the
probability of crises. In the second stage, we examine whether the predicted probability of crises
has an expected eﬀect on the stock market volatility. And we ﬁnd that higher probability of crises
is indeed connected with larger stock return volatility.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the theory. Section 3
describes the data, empirical regularity, empirical approach and results. Section 4 summarizes the
conclusions.
2 Theory
Here we propose a model that demonstrates potential links between creditor rights and stock price
volatility. It is based on the Tobin’s q investment model.
32.1 Tobin’s q Model
Consider a small open economy, producing a single aggregate tradable good. The production




where At, 1 − ρ, and Kt denote the productivity level, the distributive share of capital, and the
capital stock, respectively. We assume that productivity levels follow a ﬁrst-order autoregressive
stochastic process:
ln(At+1) = γ ln(At) + εt+1 (2)
where εt+1 follows a uniform distribution over the region [−1,1]. Using small letters to denote logs
of cap letters, we get
at+1 = γat + εt+1. (3)
Firms maximize the expected value of the discounted sum of proﬁts subject to the available
production technology and to a cost-of-adjustment investment technology. According to the latter,












where It = Kt+1−Kt, and 1
v denote net capital formation (assuming zero depreciation) and a cost-
of-adjustment coeﬃcient, respectively. In the presence of costs of adjustment, gross investment
typically exceeds net capital formation, because of the additional costs of the reorganization and
retraining associated with the installation of new capital equipment.
2The model is based on Krugman (1998) and Frenkel and Razin (1996, Chapter 7).











t − Zt + qt (Kt + It − Kt+1)

, (5)
where the Lagrangian qt could be interpreted as Tobin’s q.







Denoting ln(Kt) as kt and linearizing ln(υ (qt − 1) + 1) gives
kt+1 = kt + v (qt − 1). (7)

















where Rt+1 is the capital rental rate. The optimal-investment rule in equation (8) implies that the
cost of investing an additional unit of capital in the current period must be equal to the expected
present value of the next period’s marginal productivity of capital, plus the next period’s induced
fall in the adjustment cost of investment resulting from the enlarged stock of capital, plus the
continuation value in the capital remaining for the entire future.
Note that from equation (1):
Rt+1 = (1 − ρ)At+1K
−ρ
t+1. (9)
5Linearizing ln(Rt+1), and denoting π ≡ 1 + ln(1 − ρ), yields:
Rt+1 = π − ρkt+1 + at+1. (10)







= v (qt+1 − 1)
2 (11)






(1 + Rt+1) −
1
2
v (qt+1 − 1)
2 + (qt+1 − 1)

, (12)
At the deterministic steady state, It = 0, and qt = 1. Therefore, around the steady state,
the term (qt+1 − 1)
2 is in an order of magnitude smaller than (qt+1 − 1). According to the log
linearization approximation, we can then drop the square term from equation (12) and obtain:
(1 + r)qt = Et [Rt+1] + Et [qt+1]. (13)
2.1.1 Free Market Valuation of q
Combining equations (7), (10) and (13), we get:
qt =
(π + ρv − ρkt + γat + Etqt+1)
1 + r + ρv
. (14)
We then solve qt by a “guess”:
qt = B0 + B1at + B2kt. (15)
6From equations (7) and (15), we get
Etqt+1 = B0 + B1 (γat) + B2 (kt + v (qt − 1)). (16)
Substituting equations (15) and (16) into equation (14), we solve B0, B1, B2 by comparing













2.2 Creditor Protection and Credit-Constrained Investment
We now analyze a Tobin’s q mechanism that evolves around credit constraints.4
Assume that the ﬁrm has to borrow from the creditor a durable input Wt, where Wt ∈ [0,1].
At the end of the period t, the ﬁrm needs to return Wt. For simplicity, assume that the interest
rate paid on the durable input is zero. Then the ﬁrm will borrow up to 1. However, there are some
chances that the ﬁrm is not willing, or able, to return Wt, and the creditor has to go to a costly
court procedure to claim back the durable good Wt. Therefore, the creditor imposes an ex ante
constraint on how much the ﬁrm can borrow. More speciﬁcally,
Wt ≤ min[ωAt,1]. (18)
The borrowed input is constrained by the ﬁrm’s productivity level At: as At decreases, the ﬁrm
will have to borrow less. Finally, higher ω is associated with better creditor protection.5
3Note that the jumping variable qt is negatively related to the state variable kt.
4See Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Hart and Moore (1994), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and Mendoza (2006).
5In the literature on credit constraint and ﬁnancial accelerator, the constraint tends to be based on a ﬁrm’s market
value qtkt. However, if both qt and kt are endogenous as in Mendoza (2006), then no tractable solution is available.
By using At rather than qt, we are able to provide tractable closed-form solutions.




Therefore, if Wt = ωAt , then Y = AtωAtK
1−ρ
t . However, if Wt = 1 , Y = AtK
1−ρ
t .
According to equation (3), at+1 lies uniformly within [γat − 1,γat + 1], then the probability of
a binding constraint is:
Pr(Wt+1 < 1) =





with the assumption that γat − 1 < −lnω < γat + 1.











t − Zt + qt (Kt + It − Kt+1)

. (20)
where the Lagrangian multiplier, qt, is interpreted again as Tobin’s q.
Maximizing this Lagrangian will again gives us equations (7) and (8), although now the form
for Et [Rt+1] is diﬀerent. At time t, the ﬁrm needs to take into account whether the constraint will






= Et [π − ρkt+1 + at+1 + ln(Wt+1)] (21)
= Et [π − ρkt+1 + 2at+1 + lnω |Wt+1 < 1] ∗ Pr(Wt+1 < 1)
+Et [π − ρkt+1 + at+1|Wt+1 = 1] ∗ Pr(Wt+1 = 1)
= π − ρkt+1 + γat −
1
4
(lnω + (γat − 1))
2 .
Note that Et [π − ρkt+1 + 2at+1 + lnω |Wt < 1] is the expected Rt+1 when the constraint is bind-
ing, while Et [π − ρkt+1 + at+1|Wt = 1] is the expected Rt+1 when the constraint is not binding.
8Combining equations (7), (8) and (21) generates
q0
t =
π + ρv − ρkt + γat − 1
4 (lnω + (γat − 1))
2 + Etqt+1
1 + r + ρv
. (22)















































































Note that as credit-constraint laxity coeﬃcient, ω, rises, so does the market value of the ﬁrm, qt;
because B0
0 is increasing in ω.6
6Note that (1 − ln$) is positive in the model. Therefore, as $ increases, (1 − ln$)
2 decreases.
























As ω increases, B0






. Therefore, better creditor protec-
tion reduces the price volatility. The intuition is that Rt+1 ﬂuctuates when the credit constraint
oscillates between binding and non-binding (see equation (21)). As ω goes down, the diﬀerence
in output in the state where Wt+1 = 1 and the state where Wt+1 = ωAt+1 becomes larger, thus
output ﬂuctuates more and as a result Rt+1 becomes more volatile. Note that as ω increases, B0
0
increases, so Tobin q0
t increases rather than decreases.
Earlier, we assume that γat−1 < −lnω < γat+1, which allows the constraint to shift between
binding and non-binding. Now suppose that the constraint is always binding, i.e., γat+1 < −lnω,






= Et [π − ρkt+1 + at+1 + ln(Wt+1)] (27)
= Et [π − ρkt+1 + 2at+1 + lnω]
And equation (22) becomes
q00
t =
(π + ρv − ρkt + 2γat + lnω + Etqt+1)
1 + r + ρv
10Again, we can solve q00
t by a “guess”, and obtain
B00


























Hence, when the credit constraint always binds, better creditor protection (i.e., higher ω) will
increase the stock price, but may not have impact on the price volatility.
3 Empirical Analysis
In this section we test whether credit constraints and creditor protection indeed aﬀect stock market
volatility in the way predicted by the model. We ﬁrst discuss the data, empirical regularities, the
empirical approach, and then present the results.
3.1 Data
The data used in this project comes from the combination of sources as described in the Appendix.
Our creditor protection index comes from La Porta, et al. (1998).7 The creditor rights index
ranges from 0 to 4 and is formed by adding one when the country imposes restrictions, such as
creditor consent or minimum dividends to ﬁle for reorganization; when secured creditors are able to
gain possession of their security once the reorganization petition has been approved (no automatic
stay); when secured creditors are ranked ﬁrst in the distribution of the proceeds that result from the
disposition of the assets of a bankrupt ﬁrm; and when the debtor does not retain the administration
of its property pending the resolution of the reorganization. Therefore, higher creditor rights index
is associated with better protection for creditors. Figure 1 shows the countries in our sample that
fall into diﬀerent categories of the creditor rights index.
7See http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/Data/l&fweb.xls.
11Figure 1: The distribution of countries over creditor rights index (CR)
non-OECD OECD
CR=0




Australia, Canada, Finland, 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, 
Switzerland
CR=2 Chile
Belgium, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, Turkey
CR=3 Korea, South Africa, Thailand
Austria, Denmark, Germany, 
Korea, New Zealand
CR=4
China, Egypt, Hong Kong, India, 
Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, Singapore
United Kingdom
12The data for stock market indexes come from Global Financial Data. We have monthly data
(end of month closes, as calculated by central banks, national statistical agencies, or stock exchanges
themselves). The country coverage includes emerging economies as well as developed economies for
the years 1984-2004.8 We converted all stock market indexes in U.S. dollar terms by multiplying
them by the end of month exchange rates and scaled them down by the U.S. CPI index at the end
of the month.
To measure the stock return volatility (σ), we use the Oﬃcer’s method (Oﬃcer (1973)). The
Oﬃcer method estimates the stock return standard deviation for month 1 to month 12; next
estimate the standard deviation from month 2 to month 13; and then repeat the procedure, rolling
the sample forward continuously. A potential problem with Oﬃcer’s approach is that the use of
overlapping observations will create a correlation between standard deviations at diﬀerent points
in time. An alternative is to use non–overlapping observations. That is, to compute the standard
deviation using, say, months 1 through 12, 13 through 24, and so forth. The problem is that this
procedure results in relatively few data points. We tried both methods and obtain similar results.
3.2 Empirical Regularity
Figure 2 demonstrates the link between credit protection and stock return variability. We can see
that better creditor protection is associated with lower stock price volatility. This relationship is
conﬁrmed statistically: the linear regression of the log of stock return volatility (σ) on creditor
rights index (CR), OECD dummy and the interaction of the two yields the following result
Log(σ) = 2.26 − 0.47 ∗ OECD − 0.11 ∗ CR + 0.060 ∗ OECD ∗ CR + ε,
where ε is a robust standard error. All coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant at one percent
conﬁdence level, the total eﬀect of CR for OECD countries is signiﬁcantly negative at four percent
8The panel is unbalanced.
13conﬁdence level, and adjusted R2 is equal to 0.11. The magnitude of the eﬀect of creditor rights
on stock market volatility is non–negligible, although not very large — an increase in creditor
protection from 0 to 4 for a non-OECD country would lower stock market volatility by one standard
deviation, while for an OECD country, by about a half of the standard deviation.
We obtain the data on interest rates from IMF International Financial Statistics. In most cases
we use money market rate. When money market rate is not available, we use the discount rate. We
calculate real interest rate by subtracting the inﬂation rate from the nominal interest rate. We then
calculated annual percentage changes in these real interest rates to identify ﬁnancial crisis episodes
as described in the previous section. Table 1 lists the ﬁnancial crisis episodes that we identiﬁed.
3.3 Empirical Approach
In our theoretical model, the credit constraint mechanism works through a random situation,
where the constraint moves between binding and non-binding. That is, the mechanism is based on
a probability that the credit constraint is binding. In the empirical model, we use the probability
of liquidity crises to proxy for the probability of binding. Hence, our empirical measure of the
liquidity crisis is directly related to the theoretical counterpart of the credit constraint.
In recent literature, ﬁnancial crises are triggered not only by fundamental shocks, but also
by the degree to which market expectations about these fundamentals are coordinated. In the
absence of common knowledge, an individual market participant receives only an independent and
noisy signal about the fundamentals but also must have some uncertainty about the other market
participants’ expectations. Morris and Shin (2000) show how the market participants’ knowledge
about the statistical distributions of the signals and the market fundamentals (but not the actual
realization of the fundamental and its idiosyncratic signals) helps to coordinate the behavior of
market participants. The coordination of expectations induces a unique equilibrium in such a set
up, in which there exists a unique threshold level of the fundamental.9
9In a limiting case when the signal’s residual approaches zero.
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15This recent theory of ﬁnancial crises can guide us as to how to design our empirical approach.
Financial crises are cast in terms of self-fulﬁlling expectation games. Self-fulﬁlling expectations
games played by market participants have elements of a “beauty contest” (Allen, Morris and Shin,
2003). Market participants must care not just about acting in the way that conforms with current
fundamentals, but also about acting similarly to the way other do. Institutional features determine
the stochastic distribution of the fundamentals and the eﬀect of the market fundamentals on the
performance of institutions. Thus, for example, creditor protection exerts not only a direct eﬀect
on stock return volatility, but it could also have an indirect eﬀect on the volatility, through its
impact on the probability of ﬁnancial crises.
We deﬁne ﬁnancial crisis as an event of a big increase in the real interest rate of over 5 percentage
points in one year, which corresponds to highest 10% of annual changes in real interest rate in our
sample. We also deﬁne an alternative measure, to be used for the robustness tests, where crisis
is deﬁned as an increase in the real interest rate of over 10 percentage points in one year, or top
5% of annual real interest rate changes. Table 1 presents a list of countries and years for which
our ﬁnancial crisis indicator is equal to 1. Thus, our ﬁnancial crisis variable measures domestic
ﬁnancial crises and proxies for the times when credit constraints are likely to be binding.
Following the methodology in Razin and Rubinstein (2006), we use a ﬁnancial crisis indicator





1 if yit > 0
0 if yit ≤ 0
,
where y is a latent variable and a function of our independent variables:
yit = X0
itβ + εit,
and ε have either normal or logistic PDF.
16We then construct a measure of the probability of ﬁnancial crisis as a predicted value from the
above estimation, which we use in the analysis of stock market volatility.
We ﬁrst analyze the data in a panel regression without ﬁxed eﬀects with AR(1) and het-
eroschedasticity in errors, estimating it by feasible GLS (FGLS). In this regression we test whether
credit constraints, as measured by the probability of ﬁnancial crisis, as well as creditor rights index
have an expected eﬀect on the stock market volatility. Speciﬁcally, we estimate
ln(σit) = α + γ ∗ Pr(crisis)it + Z0
itδ + ωit,
where ln(σit) is our measure of the stock market volatility, for December of each year; α is a
constant term, Zit is a set of control variables, errors ωit are allowed to be serially correlated and
heteroschedastic.
Evidently, one cannot possibly account by institutional variables for all the cross–country dif-
ferences that would aﬀect the variations in the stock market volatility between countries. Thus, we
employ country speciﬁc ﬁxed–eﬀects regression analysis. Since our creditor rights measure does not
vary over time, it drops out from these regressions. Nevertheless, we can still measure the eﬀects
of credit constraints. Speciﬁcally, we estimate
ln(σit) = αi + γ ∗ Pr(crisis)it + Z0
itδ + ωit,
where ln(σit) is our measure of the stock market volatility, for December of each year; αi are country
ﬁxed eﬀects, Zit is a set of control variables, errors ωit are allowed to be serially correlated and
heteroschedastic. We use FGLS with AR(1) disturbances in order to estimate this regression.
The above two stage system can be identiﬁed with any set of explanatory variables through
functional form. However, functional form identiﬁcation tends to be weak, which is why we include
in the ﬁrst stage the variables that are likely to aﬀect the probability of ﬁnancial crisis but do not
have a direct eﬀect on stock market volatility, at least in our sample. Thus, we identify this system
17by both functional form and exclusion restrictions.
Because the level of ﬁnancial development varies vastly across countries, we believe the deter-
minants of stock market volatility may vary as well. Thus, we estimate the second stage regressions
for the sub–samples of OECD and non–OECD countries as well as for the full sample.
In the ﬁrst stage we use two additional controls: political situation, which is measured by the
ICRG index; and de jure ﬁnancial account openness, which we obtained from Edwards (2006).
Higher value of the ICRG index indicates better political situation, higher value of the index of
ﬁnancial account openness indicates more capital mobility, fewer restrictions on capital ﬂows.
In the regressions without country ﬁxed eﬀects in the second stage we control for the country’s
wealth measured as GDP in U.S. dollars divided by population and for the size of the stock market
measured by the log of number of ﬁrms listed on the stock markets. These variables were all
obtained from Global Financial Data. We also allow for diﬀerent levels of stock market volatility
under ﬁxed and ﬂoating exchange rate regimes. We deﬁne exchange rate regime to be ﬁxed if
Reinhart & Rogoﬀ (2004) coarse index is equal to either 1 or 2.
In addition, in the regressions with and without country ﬁxed eﬀects, we control for the growth
rate of GDP per capita and for the volatility of the U.S. 3-year T-bill rate. We used the U.S. T-bill
rate for the last day of each month from FAME and calculated the measure of volatility in the
same way as we did for the stock returns. We attempted additional control variables, such as ﬁscal
situation in the country, current account, capital mobility, stock market P/E ratio, but none of
these variables entered the regressions with signiﬁcant coeﬃcients or aﬀected the results in any way
safe for some of them limiting the sample. Sovereign credit rating does enter signiﬁcantly in the
regressions, but it is highly correlated with growth rate of GDP per capita (with the correlation
coeﬃcient of 0.79), which is why we did not include it in the main speciﬁcation.
183.4 Empirical Results
We now report the results of the two stage estimation procedure: probability of crises and stock
price volatility.
3.4.1 Probability of Financial Crises
Here we report the results of our analysis using a less strict deﬁnition of a ﬁnancial crisis. We
estimated all the models with a more strict deﬁnition and found that our results are very similar,
with the coeﬃcients of interest in the second stage being larger in magnitude.
In the estimation of the ﬁrst stage, we ﬁnd that
Pr(crisis) = 1.16 − 0.16 ∗ CR − 0.02 ∗ POL − 0.01 ∗ CAP + ,
where  is the standard error, POL is the indicator of political situation in the country, CAP
is a measure of capital mobility. We ﬁnd that better creditor protection, more stable political
situation, and more open ﬁnancial account all lower the probability of domestic ﬁnancial crisis. The
McFadden’s adjusted R2 for this regression is 0.15.10 We use predicted values of this regression as
a probability of ﬁnancial crisis, our proxy for the tightness of the credit constraints, in the second
stage.
3.4.2 Stock Market Volatility
Tables 2 and 3 report the results of our second stage estimation, with results of the GLS regressions
without ﬁxed eﬀects reported in Table 2 and those with ﬁxed eﬀects reported in Table 3. We control
for the growth rate of GDP per capita and for the volatility of the U.S. 3-year T-bill rate in both
sets of regressions. In the regressions without country ﬁxed eﬀects we also control for the level of
GDP per capita, the log of number of ﬁrms listed on the stock market, and the indicator of whether
10The described regression is estimated using probit. We obtain almost identical results with logit regressions.
19the country has a ﬁxed exchange rate regime.
Both Tables present the results for the full sample (columns (1) and (4)), the non-OECD
countries (columns (2) and (5)), and the OECD countries (columns (3) and (6)). The countries
that joined the OECD during our sample period are classiﬁed as non–OECD prior to joining and
as OECD in the aftermath.
In the regressions without ﬁxed eﬀects, presented in Table 2, we can estimate the eﬀects of cred-
itor rights index. As model predicts, we ﬁnd that better creditor protection leads to lower volatility
of the stock market. Adding our proxy for the tightness of the credit constraint, the predicted
probability of ﬁnancial crisis, we see that indeed some of the eﬀect of the creditor protection works
through the probability of the ﬁnancial crisis, since the coeﬃcients on the creditor rights index
in columns (4)-(6) are lower than those in columns (1)-(3), which did not include the predicted
probability of the ﬁnancial crisis.11 However, there remains a direct eﬀect of creditor protection on
the stock market volatility.
We note that the eﬀect of creditor protection is much smaller in OECD countries, which is
expected because the property rights protection in OECD countries tends to be better overall,
making creditor protection less important. In fact, once we control for the probability of ﬁnancial
crisis, the creditor rights indicator no longer has a signiﬁcant direct eﬀect on the stock market
volatility in OECD countries.
As predicted by our model, higher probability of ﬁnancial crisis, which proxies for a higher
chance that credit constraints are binding, increases the volatility of the stock market. This eﬀect
is especially pronounced for the OECD countries. However, we are concerned that this correlation
between the probability of ﬁnancial crisis and the stock market volatility arises because of unob-
served diﬀerences between the countries. Thus, we estimated the model with country ﬁxed eﬀects to
11Including the predicted probability of the ﬁnancial crisis does limit our sample somewhat, thus one might be
concerned that the diﬀerence in coeﬃcients is driven by the change in sample rather than the inclusion of this variable.
We re–estimated regressions in columns (1)-(3) limiting the sample to be the same as in columns (4)-(6) and found
that limiting the sample aﬀects the coeﬃcients in a negligible way. The results are available from authors upon
request.
20analyze the time–series relationship between credit constraints and stock market volatility. Because
creditor rights index does not vary over time for each country, it drops out of the regression.
Table 3 presents the results of the analysis with country ﬁxed eﬀects. We again conﬁrm the
model prediction that higher probability of tighter ﬁnancial constraints, as proxied by the prob-
ability of ﬁnancial crisis, increases stock market volatility. However, for the OECD sample the
coeﬃcient is no longer statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting that some of the eﬀect found in Table 2
was indeed driven by the cross–country rather than within country variation in the probability of ﬁ-
nancial crises. On the other hand, the regression coeﬃcient is now higher in magnitude, most likely
because the country ﬁxed eﬀects soak up a large amount of unexplained cross–country diﬀerences
in stock market volatility.
The average probability of ﬁnancial crisis in the sample is 0.08 with the standard deviation of
0.10. The coeﬃcient in column (4) of Table 3 implies that an increase in the probability of ﬁnancial
crisis by one standard deviation is associated with a 10% increase in the stock market volatility.12
Thus, our empirical analysis conﬁrms the eﬀect of creditor protection on the stock market
volatility in an economy with credit constraints. While the eﬀects we ﬁnd are not very large, they
are likely to be biased downwards because of the measurement error associated with our proxy
for credit constraints, as well as the measurement error in the de jure deﬁnition of creditor rights
index.13
3.4.3 Robustness Tests
We conduct a series of robustness tests to make sure our ﬁndings are not driven by the exact
speciﬁcation we have chosen. We describe them in this section, but do not report the regression
tables in the interest of space. The tables are available from authors upon request.
12Log of stock market volatility increases by 0.10, which means stock market volatility itself increases by 10%.
While this number is economically meaningful, it is not very large, given that the standard deviation of our stock
market volatility measure is about 70% of its mean.
13It is well known that while the creditor rights index takes on a value of 4 in countries like India and China, de
facto creditor protection in these countries is low.
21We repeat our analysis with an alternative (stricter) deﬁnition of the ﬁnancial crisis in the ﬁrst
stage, which leads to a diﬀerent predicted probability of the crisis. The correlation between our
old and new predicted crisis probability is very high: 0.97. We repeat our second stage estimation
with this new crisis probability and ﬁnd no qualitative diﬀerences in our results and very small
quantitative diﬀerences.
Going back to our original deﬁnition of ﬁnancial crisis, we now use logit model to construct our
predicted crisis probability. The correlation of the new measure with the original one is again very
high: 0.99. We re–estimate Tables 2 and 3 using this new prediction. As expected, given the high
correlation of the measures of crisis probability, the estimated coeﬃcients are almost identical to
our main speciﬁcation.
We re–estimated the regressions in Tables 2 and 3 including the lagged dependent variable
on the right–hand side. While the coeﬃcient estimates are now slightly smaller, their signs and
signiﬁcance are not aﬀected. As we would expect, when the lagged dependent variable is included
on the right–hand side, the errors are no longer serially correlated.
In the estimation of Tables 2 and 3 we did not correct our standard errors for using the predicted
probability as an explanatory variable. As Heckman (1978) points out, consistent estimates of
variance can be obtained if the predicted probability is used as an instrument for the binary
variable on the right-hand side. We re–estimated our model in this way (with and without ﬁxed
eﬀects), using GMM, and found that our results are robust to this correction. In fact, with country
ﬁxed eﬀects, the signiﬁcance level of the coeﬃcients rises.
Finally, we attempted to include a number of other macroeconomic variables as controls in ﬁrst
or second stage of our regressions, such as current account to GDP ratio, interest margin, inﬂation
rate, change in real exchange rate etc. These variables do not have explanatory power and do not
aﬀect the results of our analysis.
224 A Concluding Remark
In this paper, we examine the connection between creditor protection and the volatility of stock
market prices. We ﬁrst show in a Tobin’s q investment model that better creditor protection, and
hence lower collateral requirements, reduces the price volatility. The main intuition is that ﬁrm’s
investment, operation and capital return ﬂuctuates when the credit constraint oscillates between
binding and non–binding, but the probability of this oscillation can be reduced by better creditor
protection. We then test the theoretical model using cross-country panel regression on aggregated
stock price volatility in 41 countries over the period from 1984 to 2004. We ﬁnd that weak creditor
protection increases the probability of liquidity crises, our proxy of the probability of credit binding,
and hence the aggregated stock price volatility. Our paper thus illustrates the importance of creditor
protection on the development of sound stock market: strong creditor rights not only increases the
stock value, but also crucially, reduces the counter–productive volatility of the stock market.
Finally, there are other mechanisms through which creditor protection may aﬀect the volatility
of stock market prices. For instance, Hale, Razin and Tong (2006) discuss the moral hazard channel.
Weak creditor protection induces ﬁrms to take riskier investments, as ﬁrms will beneﬁt from the
upper range of the realized capital return, with no need to worry about the lower range. Such
moral hazard can increase stock price volatility. We leave it to future work to test this prediction.
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26Appendix
In the regressions that are reported we used the data series constructed from the variables listed
below. In our robustness tests we used a host of additional control variables that were obtained
mostly from the IFS and the Global Financial Data.
Variable Units Frequency Source
Creditor Rights Index Index 0-4 cross-section La Porta, et al. (1998)
Composite stock market close Index monthly (eop) Global Financial Data
Exchange rate against U.S. dollar n.c./U.S.dollar monthly (eop) Global Financial Data
US CPI Index Index monthly (eop) Global Financial Data
Deposit Rate percent annual IFS, line 60l
Money Market Rate percent annual IFS, line 60b
Inﬂation rate percent annual IFS, line 64..x
GDP in U.S. dollars millions of USD annual Global Financial Data
Population thousands of people annual Global Financial Data
De jure ﬁnancial account openness Index 0-100 annual Edwards (2006)
Exchange rate regime Index 1-6 annual Reinhart & Rogoﬀ (2004)
ICRG Index of political stability Index 0-100 annual ICRG
Companies listed on stock markets units annual Global Financial Data
U.S. 3-year T-bill rate percent monthly FAME
27Table 1: List of ﬁnancial crises
Country Years of ﬁnancial crisis
Argentina 1984, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1992, 1993a, 1994a, 2001, 2004a
Australia 1984a
Brazil 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1997a, 1998a








Israel 1984, 1986, 1987, 2003a
Korea 1989a
Mexico 1984, 1985, 19889, 1995, 1998a
Peru 1991, 1992, 1993a, 1995a
Philippines 1985, 1986, 1992, 1997a
Portugal 1985a




Turkey 1990, 1991, 1994, 1996, 1998a, 1999, 2001, 2003a
a No ﬁnancial crisis by a strict deﬁnition
28Table 2: Second stage regressions. No country ﬁxed eﬀects
Full Sample non-OECD OECD Full Sample non-OECD OECD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Growth rate of -0.079 -0.53*** 0.25** -0.081 -0.48*** 0.14
GDP per capita (0.10) (0.15) (0.14) (0.12) (0.17) (0.16)
GDP per capita -2.36*** 0.74 -2.53*** -2.28*** 0.19 -2.34***
(0.30) (1.03) (0.44) (0.39) (1.01) (0.55)
Log (# ﬁrms listed -0.011 0.077** -0.044* -0.007 0.087** -0.038
on the stock market (0.020) (0.039) (0.023) (0.021) (0.040) (0.025)
Volatility of the U.S. 0.076** -0.025 0.14*** 0.084 -0.016 0.14*
3-year T-bill rate (0.035) (0.056) (0.044) (0.060) (0.096) (0.076)
I(Fixed ER regime) -0.12*** -0.032 -0.14*** -0.072* 0.032 -0.11**
(0.036) (0.061) (0.045) (0.039) (0.062) (0.049)
Creditor Rights Index -0.056*** -0.13*** -0.060** -0.043** -0.11*** -0.022
(0.017) (0.030) (0.024) (0.019) (0.033) (0.028)
Predicted probability 0.54* 0.53 1.96**
of ﬁnancial crisis (0.32) (0.36) (0.87)
Constant 2.27*** 1.88*** 2.44*** 2.16*** 1.69*** 2.24***
(0.13) (0.22) (0.16) (0.16) (0.25) (0.22)
Observations 975 458 517 784 359 425
Number of countries 41 20 23 40 19 23
ρ (AR(1) in errors) 0.41 0.44 0.36 0.39 0.38 0.34
Log likelihood -483 -270 -194 -387 -213 -147
FGSL. Dependent variable is log of stock return volatility. Standard errors in parentheses
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
29Table 3: Second stage regressions. Country ﬁxed eﬀects
Full Sample non-OECD OECD Full Sample non-OECD OECD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Growth rate of -0.26*** -0.53*** -0.015 -0.26** -0.49*** -0.074
GDP per capita (0.092) (0.13) (0.13) (0.11) (0.16) (0.15)
Log (# ﬁrms listed 0.086** 0.055 0.044 0.17*** 0.12* 0.17**
on the stock market (0.035) (0.052) (0.043) (0.046) (0.067) (0.069)
Volatility of the U.S. 0.10*** -0.04 0.19*** 0.16*** -0.035 0.24***
3-year T-bill rate (0.033) (0.052) (0.043) (0.060) (0.097) (0.076)
Predicted probability 1.05*** 1.08*** 1.32
of ﬁnancial crisis (0.32) (0.34) (1.12)
Constant 2.13*** 2.39*** 1.41*** 1.42*** 1.76*** 0.41
(0.22) (0.31) (0.27) (0.29) (0.39) (0.57)
Observations 1112 551 561 784 359 425
Number of countries 51 29 27 40 19 23
ρ (AR(1) in errors) 0.28 0.30 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.22
Log likelihood -502 -294 -192 -343 -193 -142
FGLS. Dependent variable is log of stock return volatility. Standard errors in parentheses
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
30